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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Computers in Law 
Computers in law have been used to present mainly for computer- 
aided legal instruction (programmed instruction)1 and automated 
*
Dr.Jur., M.Sc. (abd), Professor of Law, Pericles-ABLE, Moscow Russia; JD St. Louis; DEA Univ. 
Paris; LL.M., Dr.Jur. Universitaet Bremen.  Dr. Engle has written several articles on Artificial 
Intelligence and Law:  An Introduction to Artificial Intelligence and Legal Reasoning:  Using Xtalk 
to Model the Alien Tort Claims Act and Torture Victim Protection Act, 11 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL 
COMMENT 565 (2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1020460; 
Smoke and Mirrors or Science?  Teaching Law With Computers—A Reply to Cass Sunstein on 
Artificial Intelligence and Legal Science, 11 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 2 (2004), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1020461; Extraterritorial Jurisdiction:  Can 
Rico Protect Human Rights?  A Computer Analysis of a Semi-Determinate Legal Question, 3 J.
HIGH TECH. L.1 (2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1020470; 
Using WYSH Computer Programs to Model:  The Alien Tort Claims Act, 6 YALE J. L. & TECH. 161
(2004), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1020449&rec=1&srcabs=1020460, which 
contains extensive descriptions of the state of play in computer modeling of law including links to 
other scholars working in this field. 
 1. See, e.g., Dan Hunter, Teaching Artificial Intelligence to Law Students, 3 LAW TECH. J. 3
(Oct. 1994), available at 
http://www.buscalegis.ufsc.br/revistas/index.php/buscalegis/article/viewFile/5268/4837 (discussing 
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research2 (e.g., Westlaw, Lexis).  Computers can, however, also be used 
for representing legal decision-making.3 This article presents a survey of 
legal interpretive rules.  The rules presented in this survey are used as 
the rule base in the computer program accompanying this article, an 
expert system.4  The computer program models legal decision-making 
and uses the rules presented to make legal decisions, generating a report 
to justify the decision reached.  Legal interpretation is chosen as a model 
for computation representation because understanding interpretive 
methods is useful for any jurist seeking creative arguments.  This survey 
of legal interpretive rules is of both a theoretical and practical interest.  
Theoretically, this survey shows that, while the formalist/realist 
dichotomy is sometimes useful, sometimes it breaks down:  certain 
interpretive methods could be characterized at times as either formalist 
or realist.  Formalists argue for classical methods of logic such as 
induction and deduction using bright line tests.  In contrast, “realists” 
argue for flexible “standards,” policies and teleology to guide the law. 
Other similar dualistic splits exist:  between originalists and 
interpretivists, in constitutional law; between holists and monists; 
between cognitivists and skeptics; and other paired opposites that 
express various philosophical schisms, such as epistemological realism, 
or noetic eidetic reality, versus epistemological materialism, or 
empiricism.  However, as the formalism/realism split is best documented 
and most influential, at least in contemporary American legal 
scholarship, the article focuses on it as a representative type of the sort 
the methodological problems involved, especially the problems of developing syllabi for teaching 
law and AI). 
 2. See, e.g., Sandip Debnath et al., LawBOT: A Multiagent Assistant for Legal Research, 4 
IEEE INTERNET COMPUTING ONLINE (Nov.-Dec. 2000), 
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpls/abs_all.jsp?arnumber=895013&tag=1 (requires subscription); see, 
e.g., Jeffery S. Rosenfeld, Nuts & Bolts: Legal Research, THE ADVOCATE (Md. State Bar Ass'n 
Young Lawyers Section), Fall 2002, at 3 (discussing the benefits of automated research tools such 
as Eclipse and Westclip). 
 3.  See generally John Aikin, Computers and Human Reason, WASH. ST. ASS'N OF DATA 
PROCESSING MANAGERS NEWSL., Info. Processing Mgmt. Ass'n, Olympia WA, July 1, 1977 
(reviewing JOSEPH WEIZENBAUM, COMPUTER POWER AND HUMAN REASON: FROM JUDGMENT TO
CALCULATION (W.H. Freeman & Co. 1976) (discussing the use of computers to automate judicial 
decisionmaking), http://www.ipma-wa.com/news/1977/197707.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2004). 
 4. Previous efforts at developing artificial intelligence for law have also focused on expert 
systems.  See G. Greenleaf, A. Mowbray & A.L. Tyree, The Datalex Project, International 
Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law (1987), available at
http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=41737; James Popple, Shyster, Australian National University, 
available at http://cs.anu.edu.au/software/shyster/; JAMES POPPLE, A PRAGMATIC LEGAL EXPERT 
SYSTEM (1996), available at http://cs.anu.edu.au/software/shyster/book/. 
2
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of meta-theoretic debates which apply to determine the selection of a 
legal interpretive method. 
The program accompanying this article presents the jurist with a 
series of questions, and from those questions determines a legal 
outcome.  This shows that automated decision-making is possible, even 
in abstract cases where we are not dealing with substantive legal rules 
but rather with “meta-rules”:  rules for deciding rules.  Computer 
modeling of law can serve as a diagnostic tool and memory aid, forcing 
the jurist to consider possible arguments she might otherwise omit by 
reminding them of some of the more obscure general points of law that 
may not be immediately addressed in the relevant cases in her area of 
specific practice.  Formalization of the law by computer also forces 
jurists to explicit enthymematic premises, revealing otherwise 
weaknesses in their arguments, or their opponent’s.  Thus, artificial 
intelligence in law can serve practical purposes.  This survey is 
practically useful since it sets out the various interpretative arguments in 
one place.  This survey is also theoretically interesting since it shows 
that the realist/formalist dichotomy is not always adequate:  some legal 
interpretive methods can be characterized as either formalist or realist 
depending on the facts of the case at bar and judicial fidelity to the rule 
of law.  This survey is also theoretically interesting because it shows that 
the interpretive rules are internally consistent and can be presented as a 
formal system and applied by a computer program.  The inference 
engine developed using this rule base hopefully will serve to inspire 
other efforts at modeling law computationally. 
B. The Limits of the Formalism/Realism Dichotomy 
This survey reveals the limits of the formalism/realism dichotomy. 
An attempt to categorize legal interpretive methods as either formalist or 
realist soon breaks down in several regards: 
1) Axiologically:  Both the realists and their opponents were 
moral cognitivists: they believed moral values existed, but 
disagreed bitterly about what they were.  As a result, moral 
cognitivism has been largely replaced by neutral moral 
relativism; not because of the strength of relativist arguments, 
3
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but rather due to the mutual exhaustion and opposition of 
contending moral cognitivists.5
2) Epistemologically:  The formalist/realist split can also be 
only partially analyzed as a split between those arguing for 
empirical materialism (the realists) as opposed to noetic 
idealism (“pure theory”).6  We could describe this split using 
the shorthand of “Marx vs. Plato.” However (neo)platonic 
noetic theories have more or less been universally abandoned 
in favor of materialist arguments, which range from Richard 
Posner on the right to Karl Marx on the left.  Plenty of 
“classical” legal scholars are, like realists, materialists. 
3) Politically:  We could argue that realists and realist methods 
are “left’” and “reform’” oriented in contrast to the “right” 
“conservative” methods of formalists.  We might thus think 
that the realists would embrace arguments allowing the 
extension of rules so as to effectuate legal reform, and that the 
formalists would adhere to formal logic which would conserve 
and apply existing rules.  In fact however, many classical 
methods of interpretation, such as inductive ampliation, allow 
the development of new rules out of old ones.7  Teleological 
arguments are as old as Aristotle, yet are considered, at least 
here, as “realist” because they enable legal reform by opening 
the scope of judicial discretion. 
4) Economically:  The realist/formalist dichotomy also ignores 
reality.  Conservative judges have not had much difficulty 
adopting economic arguments.  Yet economic arguments are 
clearly not an element of classical logic, though they are one 
form of phronesis, that is practical reasoning.  Economic 
analysis of the law is in fact a very recent phenomenon.  While 
we can say that formalists and neo-formalists have had no 
trouble adopting economic arguments because they are 
conservative, economic analysis is not the monopoly of the 
(neo)realists.8  But “policy arguments,” a typical realist 
 5. Engle, Eric, Artificial Intelligence and Law Using Rule Based Expert Systems (Oct. 21, 
2008) (unpublished Master's thesis, Universitaet Bremen) (manuscript at 43), available 
at http://etdindividuals.dlib.vt.edu:9090/346/1/msc.doc [hereinafter Engle, Artificial Intelligence]. 
 6. Id.
 7. Engle, Eric, Legal Interpretation by Computer: Are Legal Rules Predictable? (Sept. 15, 
2008) (unpublished manuscript at 7), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1270073 [hereinafter 
Engle, Legal Interpretation]. 
 8. Engle, Artificial Intelligence, supra note 5 at 44. 
4
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method, are often in fact economic arguments.  Similarly, 
balancing tests, the flagship of realism, also often reduce to 
economic arguments due to the question of how to evaluate the 
weights of competing interests.9
Consequently, the interpretive methods could be classified as 
either:  (1) formalist rules of statutory construction; (2) formalist 
methods which constrain interpretation; (3) realist methods of 
interpretation that favor development of new legal rules; and (4) 
economic and policy arguments.  Here, we analyze interpretation 
following Savigny’s schema,10 and then try to see if the methods can be 
classified as either realist or formalist and conclude they cannot.  Some 
interpretive methods could be called formalist in some regards, or realist 
in others. 
II. INTERPRETIVE METHODS
A. Formalist Rules of Statutory Construction 
1. Text 
a.  Literal or “Plain Meaning” Interpretation 
We start this survey by considering the interpretive rules courts 
would use in their likely order of application.  Since Savigny legal 
interpretation is seen as moving from text, to context and structure to 
history and teleology, goals and policies of the law, even in U.S. law.11
 9. Engle, Legal Interpretation, supra note 7 at 7. 
 10. FRIEDRICH KARL VON SAVIGNY, SYSTEM DES HEUTIGEN ROEMISCHEN RECHTS, 206-330
(1840), available at http://dlib-
pr.mpier.mpg.de/m/kleioc/0010/exec/bigpage/%22199236_00000256%22; see, e.g., Raul Narits, 
Interpretation of Law in the Estonian Legal System, I JURIDICA INT‘L 1996, 11-16, available at 
http://www.juridicainternational.eu/index/1996/vol-i/interpretation-of-law-in-the-estonian-legal-
system. 
 11. In the hierarchy of interpretive tools, of course, the statutory language comes first. Only 
when that language is ambiguous is it necessary to examine first the statute's structure and 
purpose, and then lastly the legislative history, which is last and least authoritative 
because it ultimately matters what legislators do, i.e. enact, not what they say about what 
they do.  What various legislators say about a statute is often contradictory, unclear, 
ambiguous, or merely an expression of one of many competing views of a statute not 
necessarily shared by others who voted for it.  In some instances, however, as here, 
unambiguous, clear, uncontradicted, and specific legislative history can serve as a reliable 
interpretive guide. 
McDow v. Smith, 295 B.R. 69, 78, n.18 (E.D.Va., 2003). 
5
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Plain meaning arguments state that the law means what it says, nothing 
more or less:  statutes should be interpreted to implement the will of the 
legislator, not the judiciary.  Literal or literalist interpretation is a 
somewhat pejorative synonym for interpretation according to the plain 
meaning of the text.  The critique is that plain meaning arguments are 
tautological and provide no criteria to determine whether and when a 
meaning is “plain.”12 Furthermore, courts are sometimes, in the interest 
of justice, willing to ignore the plain language of a statute.13  A court 
may reject a literalist interpretation where such interpretation does not 
conform to “the circumstances surrounding their adoption, or for that 
matter, with the context, subject matter, historical background, effects 
and consequences, spirit and purpose, or any other factor to which courts 
advert in determining a statute's meaning.”14  Courts sometimes reject 
the literalist interpretation for those reasons.  A literal interpretation of a 
statute is not admissible where it would lead to “an absurd result.”15
This rule is obviously formalist, and is the first line argued in any 
statutory interpretation. It is also fairly easily formalized 
computationally, as is the case of most formalist arguments.  If the plain 
meaning of the text resolves the interpretation then we need not look to 
other interpretations. 
 12. See, e.g., Anthony D’Amato, Counterintuitive Consequences of “Plain Meaning,” 33 
ARIZ. L. REV. 529 (1991); Michael S. Moore, Plain Meaning and Linguistics—A Case Study, 73 
WASH. U. L.Q. 1253 (1995); Arthur W. Murphy, Old Maxims Never Die: The “Plain Meaning 
Rule” and Statutory Interpretation in the “Modern” Federal Courts, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1299 
(1975); Stephen F. Ross, The Limited Relevance of Plain Meaning, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1057 (1995); 
Frederick Schauer, The Practice and Problems of Plain Meaning: A Response to Aleinikoff and 
Shaw, 45 VAND. L. REV. 715 (1992); David A. Strauss, Propter Honoris Respectum: Why Plain 
Meaning?, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1565 (1997). 
 13.  See Davis v. Department of Labor, 317 U.S. 249 (1942); see also Director, Office Of 
Workers' Compensation Programs, United States Dep’t of Labor v. Perini North River Assoc., 459 
U.S. 297, (1983). 
 14.  See Hurley Trucking Co., Inc. v. Arizona, 39 P.3d 527 ¶ 22, (Ariz. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 
2002), rev. denied and ordered depublished, Hurley Trucking v. Arizona, 46 P.3d 408 (Ariz. May 
21, 2002)  (citing Zamora v. Reinstein, 915 P.2d 1227, 1230 (1996)). 
 15. “Although we must give effect to the statute's plain and ordinary meaning, the General 
Assembly's intent and purpose must prevail over a literalist interpretation that leads to an absurd 
result.”  Lagae v. Lackner, 996 P.2d 1281, 1284, (Colo. 2000).However plain the ordinary meaning 
of the words used in the statute may be, the courts will reject that meaning when to accept it would 
lead to a result so plainly absurd that it could not possibly have been intended by the Legislature or 
would defeat the plain legislative intention.  Kiriakids v. United Artists Communications, Inc., 440 
S.E.2d 364, 366 (S.C. 1994). 
6
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b. Maxims of Legal Interpretation 
Several maxims of interpretation can be used to determine the plain 
meaning of the law. 
i.  Expressio Unius 
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius is a specific type of 
grammatical interpretation.16  It is synonymous with inclusio unius est 
exclusio alterius.17  It is a rule of statutory construction.  It holds that 
“the express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another.”18
Thus “where a law expressly describes a particular act, thing or person 
to which it shall apply, an irrefutable inference must be drawn that what 
is omitted or not included was intended to be omitted or excluded.”19
Further, expressio can also be applied to other similar statutes:  “explicit 
direction for something in one provision, and its absence in a parallel 
provision, implies an intent to negate it in the second context.”20  Where 
the legislator gives a list of exceptions to a rule that list shall be 
considered exclusive.21  However, expressio unius is subject to 
legislative intent:  where the legislative intent is clearly contrary, 
expressio unius will not apply.22  Thus some of the interpretive rules are 
explicitly hierarchized, this does not however appear to be the case for 
all the interpretive rules. 
ii.  Exceptio firmat regulam in casibus no exceptis 
Exceptio firmat regulam in casibus non exceptis (an exception 
affirms the rule in cases not excepted).23  This maxim appears to be a 
reformulation of expressio unius.24
 16. Burgin v. Forbes, 169 S.W.2d 321, 325 (Ky. 1943); Newblock v. Bowles, 40 P.2d 1097, 
1100 (Okla. 1935). 
 17. See Burgin, 169 S.W.2d at 325. 
 18. Manchin v. Dunfee, 327 S.E.2d 710, 712 (1984); see also Riffle v. Ranson, 464 S.E.2d 
763, 770 (W. Va. 1995) (“Expressio unius est exclusio alterius (express mention of one thing 
implies exclusion of all others)”). 
 19. People v. Aarons, 305 A.D.2d 45, 51 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003) (quoting McKinney’s Cons. 
Laws of NY, Book 1, Stat. § 240). 
 20. Clinchfield Coal Co. v. FMSHRC, 895 F.2d 773, 779 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
 21. See People v. Municipal Court 574 P.2d 425 (Cal. 1978). 
 22. See In re Joseph B., 671 P.2d 852 (Cal. 1983). 
 23. Wyer v. Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 1999 Me. Super. LEXIS 135, 15, n.2 (1999). 
 24. See Bankers Sec. Life Ins. Soc. v. Kane, 689 F. Supp. 1164, 1172 (S.D. Fla. 1988). 
7
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iii.  Ejusdem generis 
Where specific words enumerate persons or things, general words 
following them are not to be construed in their widest sense but rather 
are limited to apply only to persons or things of the same class 
specifically mentioned.25  The general words following the specific 
words shall be interpreted no more generally than the specific preceding 
words.26  Thus ejusdem generis is a type of syntactic argument.  In fact it 
closely resembles “expressio unius” but appears to refer to contracts 
rather than statutes.27
iv.  Generalibus specialia derogant 
Where two hierarchically rules of law conflict with each other, one 
using specific terms, and the other general terms, any conflict in 
interpretation resulting is resolved by determining that the special 
section is controlling.  This is summarized in the maxim Generalibus 
specialia derogant (special provisions derogate from general ones).28
Generalibus specialia derogant seems to be a variant of expressio unius. 
Similarly, where the special statute is enacted after the general statute, 
the applicable maxim of statutory interpretation is 'generalibus specialia 
derogant' (special things take from general).29
At an even broader level, “The general principle to be applied to the 
construction of acts of Parliament is that a general act is not to be 
construed to repeal a previous particular act, unless there is some express 
reference to the previous legislation on the subject, or unless there is a 
necessary inconsistency in the two acts standing together.”30  Because, 
[T]he legislature having had its attention directed to a special subject, 
and having observed all the circumstances of the case and provided for 
them, does not intent [sic], by a general enactment afterwards, to 
 25. General Roofing Company v. Borough of Belmar, 187 A.2d 16, 17 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 1962). 
 26. See U.S. v. LaBrecque, 419 F. Supp. 430, 434 (D.C. N.J. 1976). 
 27. See id.; Aleksich v. Indus. Accident Fund, 151 P.2d 1016, 1021 (Mont. 1944). 
 28.  See Holloway v. Henderson, 82 So. 344, 345 (Ala. 1919); McFountain v. State, 83 So. 53 
(Ala. 1919), and cases cited; Herring v. Griffin, 100 So. 202 (Ala. 1924). 
 29.  See Bank of Montreal v. Signet Bank, 193 F.3d 818, 833 (4th Cir. 1999); Blue Mountain 
Serv. Corp. v. Zlateff , 769 P.2d 883 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989); Brown Paper Mill Co., Inc. v. Commr. 
of Internal Revenue, 255 F.2d 77, 79 (5th Cir. 1958). 
 30.  Ex Parte Kan-Gi-Shun-Ca, 109 U.S. 556, 570 (1883) (quoting Thorpe v. Adams, L.R. 6 
C.P. 135 (Bovill, C.J.)). 
8
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derogate from its own act when it makes no special mention of its 
intention so to do.31
v.  Lex posterior derogat legi priori lex posterior derogat 
anterior/lex posterior derogat priori 
The maxim “lex posterior derogat priori” states that “between an 
earlier and a later law, the later prevails.”32  At first this may seem to be 
in conflict with the maxim “expressio unius.” That is not in fact the case. 
One argument against the authority of legal maxims is that they are 
contradictory.33  However the author's research reveals otherwise. 
Several methods at first glance do seem redundant, but not contradictory.  
These include Ejusdem generis, Generalibus specialia derogant, 
Exceptio firmat regulam in casibus no exceptis, and Expressio unius est 
exclusio alterius, or inclusio unius est exclusio alterius.  All appear to 
say the same thing:  a posterior general statute must be contextualized by 
the prior specific statute such that the general instances in the second 
statute (or contract, in the case of ejusdem generis) may not be 
interpreted more generally than, or in conflict with, the prior statute 
absent express legislative intent.  The maxim of lex posterior derogat 
priori might at first appear to be in conflict with the maxim expressio 
unius.  But we must remember that just as we read statutes so that they 
are not in conflict with each other or with the constitution so must we 
also read maxims in that way.  Lex posterior states that a later law will 
supplant an earlier law.34  It expresses the general case.  Thus a true 
example of “lex posterior” is the case where the prior law is simply 
abrogated completely.  Expressio unius is then the special case where the 
prior law addresses the subject with specific terms and is followed by a 
later statute that expresses the subject in more general terms.35  Further, 
this can be seen as a fair interpretation when we see that expressio unius 
only applies where no specific legislative intent can be found to overturn 
the earlier law.36  Finally, these maxims all serve to implement the 
democratically elected legislature and operate according to predictable 
 31.  Id. at 570-71 (quoting Fitzgerald v. Champneys, 30 Law J. Ch. 782; 2 Johns. & H. 31-
54).  
 32.  Gouveia v. Vokes, 800 F. Supp. 241, 250-51 (E.D. Pa. 1992). 
 33. Engle, Legal Interpretation, supra note 7, at 13. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id.
 36. State v. Crawford, 39 185 P.3d 315, 317 (Kan. Ct. App. 2008). 
9
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rules of formal logic.  Thus, though the maxims do not always have 
express hierarchies, such hierarchization can be derived. 
vi.  Actor Incombit Probari 
This argument is merely the statement of the general principle that 
the moving party must bear the burden of proof.37  Sometimes, however, 
that fact will decide the issue. 
vii.  Dura lex, sed lex 
This maxim is positivist and formalist.  It holds that that the law is 
the law and must apply regardless of its consequences because the 
function of the court is merely to adjudicate and not to make law.38  This 
argument will not carry much weight in modern courts.39
2. Context and Structure 
a.  Syntactic Interpretation/Grammatical Interpretation 
If the plain meaning interpretation does not resolve the statutory 
argument we must then look to the context and structure of the statute. 
Syntactic arguments parse each term of the statute carefully and the 
syntactic position of each within the sentence to resolve linguistic 
ambiguities.40  For example, does “and” mean “both/and” or merely 
“either/or?”  Does “or” mean “either A or B, but not both,” or instead 
“either A or B, and possibly both?”  In other words, must cruel and 
unusual punishments be both cruel and unusual to be unconstitutional or 
merely cruel or unusual?  In syntactic interpretation, the position of the 
word within the sentence, punctuation, conjunctions, and any other 
syntactic clues are taken as evidence of the legislator’s intent. 41 
Syntactic interpretation must not reach an absurd result.42
 37. Engle, Artificial Intelligence, supra note 5, at 98. 
 38. See In re Cobos, 994 S.W.2d 313, 316 n.3 (Tex. App. 1999) (“The law is harsh, but it is 
the law.”). 
 39. See id.
 40. See L. Allen & M. Caldwell, Modern Logic and Judicial Decision Making: A Sketch of 
One View, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 213, 226 (1963) (on syntactic argument). 
 41. Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Murphy, 511 N.E.2d 515, 517 (1987). 
 42. For example, where a counterfeiter argued that a word modified only the word 
immediately preceding it and not the entire group of words, the court held through syntactic 
argument that the criminal’s exculpatory argument was no valid defence. United States. v. Stanley, 
23 F.3d 1084, 1086 (6th Cir. 1994).  
10
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Grammatical arguments likewise parse the sentence structure 
looking for clues as to the legislative intent.  Here however the focus is 
not on individual words and their positions in the sentence but rather on 
phrases, clauses, and parts of speech.43  Objections to syntactic and 
grammatical interpretation are that they search for a non-existent and 
unrealistically precise legislative intent within a statute that was either 
badly drafted or even intentionally ambiguous.  In the case where the 
ambiguity can be shown for political reasons to be intentional, the 
judicial function has every right to intervene to clarify the law.  Again, if 
the context and/or structure of the statute resolve the conflict the 
interpretation is unambiguous and we need consider no other arguments.   
Syntactic arguments are a literalist form of legal reasoning.  
b.  Contextual Interpretation/Systematic Interpretation 
Contextual interpretations, also known as systematic 
interpretation,
44
 interpret the particular law as an expression of a 
general law and thus determine the law according to the superior 
hierarchical norm.
45
  No new rule is inferred; rather the existing 
rule is expanded or contracted so that it is congruent with 
hierarchically superior norms.
46
  In systematic interpretation, the 
 43. J.R. Harris v. Commonwealth, 128 S.E. 578, 579 (Va. 1925). 
44.[I]n German jurisprudence, contextual interpretation is called systematic interpretation.  
Under this approach, ambiguous words are eliminated by reference to other related 
provisions or concepts in which the same word or term appears.  For example, if, in 
the abortion question, one has to determine whether the term “life” in the 
constitution comprises unborn human life, one can search for the meaning of "life" 
in other legal texts to discover what protection “life” has received on the 
constitutional level.  The main goal of contextual interpretation usually is the 
furtherance of the consistency and coherence of all relevant legal norms, that is, 
legal certainty.  If possible, legal terms or concepts should have consistent meanings 
in all the places where they are being used.  At the very least, their meanings should 
not conflict!  
Winfried Brugger, Concretization of Law  and Statutory Interpretation, 11 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 
207, 237 (1996). 
 45.  “In systematic interpretation, one attempts to clarify the meaning of a legal provision by 
reading it in conjunction with other, related provisions of the same section, or title, of the legal text, 
or even other texts within or outside the given legal system; thus, this method relies upon the unity, 
or at least the consistency, of the legal world.”  Winfried Brugger, Legal Interpretation, Schools of 
Jurisprudence, and Anthropology 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 395, 396-97 (1994). 
 46.  For an application of the principle of systematic interpretation see Case Concerning 
Border and Transborder Actions (Nicar. v. Hond.), 1988 I.C.J. 69, 94 (Dec. 20, 1988); Advisory 
Opinion No. 13, Competence of the International Labor Organization to Regulate, Incidentally, the 
Personal Work of the Employer, 1926 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 13, at 23 (cited in Karsten Nowrot, Emily 
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legal interpretation is determined not by reference to legislative 
intent but squarely within the legal text itself.
47
Systematic interpretation of the law is exceptional in the common 
law because, for example, “courts are constitutionally limited to resolve 
only those issues brought before the bench, a comprehensive, systematic 
interpretation of the Loft Law is not to be expected.”48  It is however 
more often found internationally.  Thus, for example, systematic 
interpretation of the U.N. charter interprets a rule “in the general 
structure and scheme of the Charter [of the United Nations].”49  The 
legal rule is thus determined by comparing it with other rules established 
in the treaty or by referring to the entire structure of the treaty.50  Again, 
these are forms of structural interpretation. 
c.  Synthetic interpretation 
Synthetic interpretation synthesizes a new rule through ampliation 
of existing rules.51  In synthetic interpretation rule one, two . . . to rule n,
whether or not hierarchically equal, imply together a new rule, rule n+1.
Rather than interpreting rule one in the light of rule two through n,
hierarchical interpretation derives a new rule.52  Thus synthetic 
interpretations “focus on the aims of the treaty and its institutional 
objectives.”53  This is still a form of structural interpretation, but the 
most open one and could be characterized for that reason as more realist 
than formalist.  According to synthetic arguments, we should view the 
law in question as one thread in a larger tapestry; the individual law 
W. Schabacker, The Use of Force to Restore Democracy: International Legal Implications of the 
Ecowas Intervention in Sierra Leone, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 321, 341 (1998)). 
 47.  [L]ogical-systematic [interpretation]... does not seek to discover the (purely 
subjective) intention of the legislator, but rather seeks the logical objective meaning 
of the statute, as an expression of the law.  According to this second approach, legal 
texts have a meaning of their own, implicit in the signs of which they are composed, 
and independent of the actual or presumed will of their authors. 
Eduardo Garcia Màynez, Introducción al estudio del derecho [Introduction to the Study of Law] 
(33d ed., 1982) translated in Robert S. Barker, 30 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 131, 141 (1998). 
 48.  Franmar Infants Wear, Inc. v. Rios, 491 N.Y.S.2d 975, 998, (N.Y.City Civ.Ct., 1985). 
 49.  Certain Expenses of the U.N., 1962 I.C.J 6, 11. 
 50.  “Under the systematic method of interpretation, the meaning of the norm is ascertained 
by comparison with other norms set forth in the treaty and by referencing the entire structure of the 
treaty.”  Nowrot and Karsten, supra note 46, at 341 
 51. Engle, Legal Interpretation, supra note 7, at 10. 
 52. Engle, Artificial Intelligence, supra note 5, at 64. 
 53. MICHAEL H. LANE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE CUSTOMS MODERNIZATION AND THE 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE SUPERHIGHWAY. 95-96 (1998). 
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cannot be interpreted in a vacuum.  Rather we must consider the other 
laws flanking it in order to understand the meaning of this law within 
that context.  Synthetic interpretation can open up the interpretations of 
laws that might otherwise be plain facially.  For example, reading the 
Nineteenth Amendment’s alteration of the Fourteenth Amendment so 
that their combined force is to ensure constitutional equality for women 
is an exercise in “synthetic interpretation” of the Constitution.54
Namely, the interpreter synthesizes two or more legal texts into a whole, 
which in fact may be greater than the each part because those two parts 
work together synergistically.55
d.  Concretization 
Concretization is essentially a principle of administrative law 
interpretation according to which the judge takes a function of "filling 
gaps" to help realize the legislative scheme for the administrative 
agency.56  Concretization views laws, particularly laws which determine 
administrative procedures, as foundational bricks and regards the 
decisions of administrative courts as being the mortar which fills in the 
open texture of the foundational laws.57  Concretization is a form of 
structural argument. One judge states: 
I view the process of administrative rule-making that sharpens 
the line between acceptable and nonacceptable conduct as akin 
to what jurisprudence does in concretizing the norms of a 
statute by judicial decision-making that addresses itself to 
specific case scenarios.  The term is derived from Hans 
Kelsen's General Theory of Law and State (citation omitted). 
Kelsen explained the concept of concretization in the 
following passage:  ‘From a dynamic standpoint, the 
individual norm created by the judicial decision is a stage in a 
process beginning with the establishment of the first 
constitution, continued by legislation and custom, and leading 
to the judicial decisions.  The process is completed by the 
execution of the individual sanction.  Statutes and customary 
laws are, so to speak, only semi-manufactured products which 
 54. See Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE L.J. 453, 459 
(1989). 
 55. See Allen & Caldwell, supra note 40, at 226. 
 56. Engle, Legal Interpretation, supra note 7 at 13. 
 57. Id.
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are finished only through the judicial decision and its 
execution.  The process through which law constantly creates 
itself anew goes from the general and abstract to the individual 
and concrete.  It is a process of steadily increasing 
individualization and concretization.’58
e.  Legal Completion (Rechtsergaenzung)/Legal Interpretation 
This type of interpretation seeks to cure lacunes in the law by 
examining a phrase in the law with respect to that same phrase as 
elsewhere defined in the law.59  It is a form of structural interpretation. 
3. History (Historical/Genetic Interpretation) 
If the text, context, or structure of the statute do not resolve the 
interpretive conflict we must then consider the statutory history to see 
the legislator’s intent.  Historical interpretation examines the legal 
history surrounding the creation of the statute in a search for legislative 
intent, an example of the will-theory of law.60  The usual argument 
against historical interpretation is that the legislative intent is ambiguous 
or even non-existent, particularly when the case at bar is one of first 
impression and not within the imagination of the legislator at the time 
the legislation was enacted.61  Here the interpretation starts to open up. 
The historical interpretation could be seen as a legal realist method or as 
more literalism depending on how serious the research into discerning 
the legislative intent, which may be unclear or conflicted, is taken.  It is 
less easily generally formalized since the legislative history depends on 
each statute in question. 
 58.  Ethics Comm’n v.  Keating, 958 P.2d 1250 (Okla. 1998); see also Federal Trade 
Comm’n v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470 (1952) (“The right or obligation results not merely from the 
abstract expression of the will of Congress in the statute, but from the Commission's completion and 
concretization of that will in its order.”); State v. Martin, 532 P.2d 316, 323 (Alaska 1975) (holding 
that “absent judicial concretization, the ordinary citizen desiring to comply with the law would be 
forced to speculate” about the laws impact on him); In re Grayson-Robinson Stores, Inc., 321 F.2d 
500, 502 (2d Cir. 1963) (holding that concretization uses the specific facts of a particular situation 
to give appropriate meaning to judicial decisions); United States v. Articles of Drug Labeled 
Colchicine, 442 F. Supp. 1236, 1241 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).  
 59. Engle, Legal Interpretation, supra note 7, at 9. 
 60.  “In historical analysis, the interpreter attempts to identify what the founders of a legal 
document wanted to regulate when they used certain words and sentences; here, both the specific 
and the general declarations of intent are of crucial importance.”  Brugger, supra note 45, at 397. 
 61. Engle, Artificial Intelligence, supra note 5, at 62. 
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4.  Teleology “Realist” Methods of Interpretation that Favor 
Development of New Legal Rules
The following arguments can be considered “realist” as many of 
them, such as probabilistic reasoning, have only come to be accepted in 
the last century and further because they tend to “open up” the 
interpretation to allow application to new cases or even to create new 
rules altogether.62  As such they are more difficult to model 
algorithmically, but nonetheless are tractable. 
a.  Probabalistic Reasoning 
The classical problem in torts of probabilistic reasoning occurs 
when we have several potential tortfeasors and a definite victim of an 
instrumentality common to all tortfeasors.  For example, consider three 
manufacturers of a carcinogenic product, and it is unknown which of the 
three produced the defective product in the case at bar.63  The idea is to 
argue that each potential tortfeasor should be held proportionally liable 
according to market share, even though causation cannot be proven, to 
avoid the absurd result of non-liability that would otherwise occur.  This 
is sometimes referred to as “market share liability.”64  Probabilistic 
arguments are also made in cases of multiple causation or mutual 
causation, for example, in comparative negligence regimes, where the 
plaintiff and defendant both partially contributed to the resulting 
accident.  Probabilistic reasoning looks at stochastic processes in order 
to determine what is most likely to have happened.65  For example, if a 
plaintiff has 90% of the market share of a product, say asbestos.66  The 
defendant suffers from injuries resulting from exposure to asbestos.  A 
probabilistic argument would hold that, if the actual source of the 
asbestos could not be proven, due, say, to multiple exposure to various 
potential sources over several years, then the defendant should be held 
liable in proportion to the likelihood that their product caused the injury.  
Supposing that there was an 80% likelihood that the injury was in fact 
caused by asbestos.  Then the defendant would, using probabilistic 
reasoning, be liable for 72% of the damages to plaintiff (90% of 80%).  
 62. Engle,, Legal Interpretation, supra note 7, at 18. 
 63. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbot Laboratories, 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980). 
 64. Abad v. Bayer Corporation, 563 F.3d 663, 670 (7th Cir. 2009). 
 65. In re TMI Litigation 193 F.3d 613, 640 (3d Cir. 1999).  
 66.  See, e.g., Sindell, 607 P.2d at fn. 28. 
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Thus the strength of the argument is proportionate to its probability.67  A 
probabilistic proof need not, as illustrated above, be 100% certain.  
“Proof of a material fact by inference from circumstantial evidence need 
not be so conclusive as to exclude every other hypothesis. It is sufficient 
if the evidence produces in the mind of the trier a reasonable belief in the 
probability of the existence of the material fact.”68  Inferences are 
determined as valid or not depending on whether the inference is “so 
unreasonable as to be unjustifiable.”69  That is, an inference may be 
merely supported by the evidence and does not need to be compelled by 
the evidence as the only possibility.70  Juries are permitted to “chain” 
several inferences into a series of inferences leading to a conclusion 
which would not be supportable if the inferential chain’s elements were 
viewed separately.71  A jury is free to make inculpatory as well as 
exculpatory inferences.72  This method could be seen as formalist 
because the market shares are determinate or as realist since it is not a 
clear bright line test that will lead to a certain foreseeable result.  
b.  Comparative Argument 
The essence of comparative argumentation is that the courts of this 
jurisdiction should be willing to compare the decisions of other 
jurisdictions in making their determinations as to what the law is or 
should be.73  For example, in Geddes Lawrence v. Texas, the U.S. 
Supreme court considered decisions of the European Court of Human 
Rights in reaching the decision that criminalization of homosexual acts 
was unconstitutional.74  The Supreme Court also used comparative 
method in Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd to determine the interpretation 
of the French words “lésion corporelle” in a treaty to which the U.S. was 
a signatory and in which French was the official language.75 Similarly 
the Pinochet cases in Britain cited extensively to U.S. decisions as 
 67.  Goldhirsh Group, Inc. v. Alpert, 107 F.3d 105, 108 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 68.  State v. Copas, 746 A.2d 761, 782 (Conn. 2000) (citing Service Road Corp. v. Quinn, 698 
A.2d 258 (Conn. 1997)); accord Pierce v. Albanese, 129 A.2d 606 (Conn. 1957). 
 69.  State v. Ford, 646 A.2d 147 (Conn. 1994). 
 70.  Copas, 746 A.2d at 782. 
 71.  State v. Crafts, 627 A.2d 877, 882 (Conn. 1993). 
 72.  See State v. Stanley, 613 A.2d 788, 792 (Conn. 1992). 
 73. Engle, Artificial Intelligence, supra note 5, at 75. 
 74.  539 U.S. 558, 560, 573 (2003). 
 75.  499 U.S. 530, 536-547 (1991), see also Eric Engle, European Law in American Courts: 
Foreign Law as Evidence of Domestic Law, 33 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 99, 104 (2007), available at 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/students/orgs/hela/Europa/Foreign.htm. 
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persuasive evidence of British law as to immunity, comity and other 
common law doctrines relevant to international law.76  It can be 
characterized as a realist method because it opens the scope of 
interpretation to judicial discretion. 
c.  Teleological Argument (also called logical interpretation) 
Once text, context, structure, and history are exhausted 
interpretation looks to the ends, or goals, of the law.  Teleology, also 
known as final causality,77 is the idea of Aristotle that objects contain 
within themselves the blueprints of their own ultimate development.  For 
examples, the teleology of an acorn is a mighty oak; the teleology of a 
boy is a man.  Legal teleology argues that law serves intermediate ends 
as means to the ultimate end of justice,78 whether distributive, also 
known as “geometric” or “social” justice,79 or commutative, also known 
as “arithmetic” or “transactional” justice.80  A teleological argument of 
criminal law would hold that the purpose of a criminal law is not merely 
to deter and punish but also to correct so that the criminal reaches their 
full human potential.  Teleological arguments have appeared, for 
example, in areas of law as diverse as equal protection jurisprudence and 
banking law.81  Teleological argument can trump literal arguments.82
Teleological argument could be considered realist in that it leaves a large 
scope to judicial discretion. 
d.  Multi-Factor Interest Balancing Tests 
One of the preferred methods of legal realist jurisprudence is multi-
factor interest balancing tests.83  In such tests the court weighs the 
interests of all relevant parties, not necessarily merely the interests of the 
 76. See Eric Engle, Alien Torts in Europe? Human Rights and Tort in European Law, ZERP 
Discussion Paper, DP 1/2005, available at http://works.bepress.com/eric_engle/23. 
 77.  Book Review, John Courtney Murray And The American Civil Conversation 10 J.L. &
RELIGION 589, 594 (1993/1994). 
 78.  U.S. v. General Dynamics Corp., 644 F. Supp. 1497, 1500 (C.D. Cal. 1986). 
 79.  See Aristotle, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, Book V. (c. 350 B.C.). 
 80.  Id.
 81.  Kite v. Marshall, 661 F.2d 1027, 1030 (5th Cir. 1981). 
 82.  Fidelity Sav. and Loan Ass’n v. Federal Home Loan Bank, 689 F.2d 803, 813 (9th Cir. 
1982). 
 83.  See James G. Wilson, Surveying the Forms of Doctrine on the Bright Line-Balancing Test 
Continuum, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 773, 773 (1995); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the 
Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 945 (1987).  
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plaintiff and defendant.84  The court then determines the relevant weight 
of these various interests and then determines which group of interests is 
predominant and uses this preponderation to determine whether and how 
the law applies.85  Multi-factor interest balancing tests, however, can be 
easily manipulated and thus suffer from the same critiques made by 
realists of the methods of formalism!  The ambiguity in weighting 
factors can be rendered objective by use of economic arguments.  This 
partly explains the rise of law and economics in U.S. jurisprudence. 
e.  Economic and Policy Arguments 
i.  Economic Argument 
Economic arguments are extremely popular in the United States 
“[T]he common law is best explained as if the judges were trying to 
maximize economic welfare . . . .  Common law adjudication brings the 
economic system closer to the results that would be produced by 
effective competition–a free market operating without significant 
externality, monopoly, or information problems.”86  One can criticize 
law and economics as suffering from reductionism, for it reduces 
complex transactions to one fungible standard, money.  Of course in fact 
not all transactions are fungible.  Not all values are quantifiable, nor is 
there a market for all possible transactions.  Thus, the reductionist 
position of economic arguments can lead to theoretical absurdities.87
Naturally, there is a place for qualified economic arguments, namely 
where those arguments are contextualized by other values that are not 
transferable or quantifiable.  However the singular success of economic 
arguments in the United States has led to a commodification of law 
which ignores non-market values causing injustice and was probably in 
no small part the result of the collapse of the idea of objective morality 
due to competing versions of morality posited by realists and formalists 
undermined simultaneously by moral relativists claiming to be following 
the ideas of Hume and Nietzsche.88
 84. See, e.g. Rhode v. Adams, 957 P.2d 1124, 1127 (Mont. 1998). 
 85. Engle, Artificial Intelligence, supra note 5, at 76. 
 86. RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE, p. 4-5 (1981). 
 87. Engle, Artificial Intelligence, supra note 5, at 78. 
 88.  See, e.g., FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ANTICHRIST; BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL. See DAVID 
HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE, Book III, Part I, § 1. 
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ii.  Policy Arguments 
Arguments from policy are a sort of teleological argument and can 
be seen as realist in that they open argument to judicial discretion.  
Policy arguments look at the goals served by the laws in order to 
interpret the meaning of the law.89  However, if policy arguments are to 
avoid question begging then we need to determine what the exact policy 
or policies are that justify the interpretation.  Legal certainty, judicial 
economy, conservation of scarce resources, preservation of a free 
market, and the encouragement of the production of wealth are all 
examples of broad ranging policies used to guide interpretation of law. 
B.  Argumentation:  Methods which constrain Interpretation 
Realist and interpretivist methods tend to open up interpretation to 
allow creative lawyering and judging; formalist and originalist 
arguments reduce the possible range of applications of a legal rule. 
Rightly or not, just as realism is seen as left wing, formalism is seen as 
conservative. 
1.  Deductive Argument (Syllogism) 
Deductive Argument reasons from general principles to specific 
instances.90  For example, the statute provides a general rule and the 
specific facts of the case are argued as fitting the rule.  In common law 
courts that is about the extent of deductive argument, and indeed, courts 
sometimes make errors in logic.91  However, in civil law courts 
deductive reasoning plays the principle role.  In civil law courts it is 
possible to argue deductively from generally recognized principles of 
law to determine outcomes in specific cases.  
2.  Bright Line Tests 
 Bright line tests are merely “either-or” binary tests of a sort 
“either guilty or innocent” dependent on fixed objective indicia.92  To a 
realist, they are the perfect example of elevating form over substance. To 
 89. Engle, Artificial Intelligence, supra note 5, at 78. 
 90.  People v. Martinez, 51 P.3d 1046, 1050 (Colo. App. 2001). 
 91.  For an example of clearly erroneous misapplication of the U.S. federal appeals court see, 
Miller v. Champion Enterprises Inc., 346 F.3d 660, 679 (6th Cir. 2003).  The court in Helwig v. 
Vencor, 251 F.3d 540, 554-55 (6th Cir. 2000) makes the exact same error! 
 92. Engle, Legal Interpretation, supra note 7, at 15. 
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the formalist, they are the bulwark of the rule of law, for law must be 
foreseeable to be valid both in the sense of its own legitimacy and in the 
sense of an effective admonition to potential law-breakers prior to the 
fact.  All of the rules of statutory construction described above can be 
considered to be “bright line tests.” 
3.  Analogical Argument 
Arguments by analogy hold that the decision in case A should 
apply to case B because cases A and B have several facts in common 
and the points which they do not have in common are essentially 
irrelevant to the applicability of the decision.  The argument of analogy 
is that likes should be treated alike. However: 
Logicians teach that one must always appraise an analogical 
argument very carefully. Several criteria may be used:  (1) the 
acceptability of the analogy will vary proportionally with the number of 
circumstances that have been analyzed; (2) the acceptability will depend 
upon the number of positive resemblances (similarities) and negative 
resemblances (dissimilarities); or (3) the acceptability will be influenced 
by the relevance of the purported analogies. 
For Appellants to draw a proper analogy, they had the burden in the 
district court, as they do here, of showing that the similarities in the facts 
of the two cases outweigh the differences.93
4.  Reductio ad absurdam Proof 
Reductio arguments are elegant and powerful in simplicity but in 
the author's opinion, and that of some courts, are somewhat risky as they 
depend on the truth of all presumptions in the argument.94  Essentially, 
an argument by reductio presumes the opposite of what is to be proven, 
and shows that that presumption leads to a logical impossibility, in 
 93.  See In Re Linerboard Antitrust Litigation, 305 F.3d 145, 157 (3d. Cir. 2002) (citing Irving 
M. Copi & Keith Burgess-Jackson, Informal Logic 166 (3d ed. 1996)); see Arthur L. Goodheart, 
Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 YALE L.J. 161, 179 (1930); JOHN H. WIGMORE,
WIGMORE’S CODE OF THE RULES OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT LAW 118 (3d ed. 1942); JOHN 
STUART MILL, A SYSTEM OF LOGIC RATIOCINATIVE AND INDUCTIVE 332-33 (8th ed. 1916) (“Two 
things resemble each other in one or more respects; a certain proposition is true of one; therefore it 
is true of the other.”). 
 94.  “Reductio ad absurdum arguments frequently are untrustworthy, and this one should be 
examined with care.”  Cf. J. Parreco & Son, 567 A.2d  46 (D.C. 1989) (warning against judicial 
overeagerness to invoke the “absurd result” doctrine as a guide to construction).”  Richardson v. 
Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 826 A.2d 310, 352 (D.C. 2003) (dissent). 
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theoretical terms, or to an absurdity, in practical terms.95  Vulgar forms 
of this argument can be criticized as conclusory, merely asserting that 
the position of the opponent ludicrous.  However, well-formed reductios 
grant the opponent’s major premise but show that that premise entails a 
conclusion that is either logically impossible or practically ridiculous. 
That is the risk of the reductio:  one grants an opponent's premise, an 
undesirable move generally, but here as a gambit.  If the gambit 
succeeds the argument is won.  If it fails, it will likely be lost, although 
arguing in the alternative may save the day. 
5.  Inductive Argument  
Arguments by induction, the principal engine of common law 
reasoning, are similar to arguments by analogy.96  Inductive logic, 
reasoning from particular instances to general rules, is the opposite of 
deductive logic, which is reasoning from general rules to particular 
cases.97  Both are admissible forms of reasoning in the common law, 
though deduction generally corresponds to statutory law and induction to 
case law.98
In an inductive ampliation we infer a general rule to govern a series 
of similar cases from the fact that that series of cases had both a similar 
rule and similar facts.99  Sometimes the common law is presented as 
being ampliative.  Inductive ampliation and reasoning by analogy are 
similar but not the same.  In ampliation we infer a new rule from an 
existing set of cases and rules.  In reasoning by analogy we apply the 
rule in one case to determine the rule in another case due to their factual 
similarity.100  No new rule is inferred in the case of reasoning by 
analogy, unlike inductive ampliation. 
 95. Engle, Artificial Intelligence, supra note 5, at 72. 
 96. The engine of the common law is inductive reasoning. It proceeds from the particular to 
the general.  It is an experimental method which builds its rules in tiny increments, case-
by-case.  It is cautious advance always a step at a time.  The essence of its method is the 
continual testing and retesting of its principles in “those great laboratories of the law, the 
courts of justice” (Smith, Jurisprudence, p. 21). 
Hearst Corp. v. Clyne, 409 N.E.2d 876 (N.Y. 1980). 
 97.   Dunn v. State, 454 So.2d 641, 646 n.5 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984). 
 98.  “[E]vidence can be either direct or circumstantial; that we can establish truth via 
inductive reasoning, as well as by deductive reasoning.”  Wilson v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc. 739 
So. 2d 802, 802, (La. Ct. App. 1998) (Fitzsimmons, concurring opinion). 
 99. Engle, Artificial Intelligence, supra note 5, at 73. 
 100.  See United States v. Tapia, 309 F.3d 1283 (10th Cir. 2002); In Re Linerboard Antitrust 
Litigation, 305 F.3d 145, 158 (3d. Cir. 2002). 
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III. THE COMPUTER PROGRAM
The rules exposed above are used as a rule base for a computer 
program to model legal decision-making that accompanies this article. 
The computer program serves as a sort of legal compendium, a checklist 
if you will, not of various forms to be made out but rather of arguments 
that could be made.  The computer program applies algorithms that 
determine the strength of the argument to be computed.  The strength of 
the argument can either be predetermined by the user or by comparing 
the facts of the case to the conditional that triggers the rule.  If the 
conditional that the rule expresses is satisfied then the method will be 
applicable and will determine the likely outcome of the case.  The 
program limits itself to the practical legal question whether a legal 
method would or would not apply.  The program only implicitly 
considers the theoretical debates discussed in the paper as part of the 
structure of the source code of the program.  To do otherwise would 
make the program open-ended, and thus less determinate and of 
questionable use in practice.  Further, such considerations would require 
a great deal of effort for little tangible reward in terms of scientific 
explanations and predictions of the law.  Finally, that would take an 
already somewhat ambitious program and threaten it with greater 
complexity, larger file size, and would essentially bring it outside the 
range of a law review article. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS
This survey shows that economic thought pervades Anglo-
American legal discourse.  It also shows that the law is fundamentally 
conservative:  not merely through burdens of proof weighing against 
moving parties, but also in the economic evaluation of the weight to be 
affected to different variables used to represent particular legal methods. 
Seeing the extent and limits of modeling law by computer reveals the 
extent of objectivity in the law. 
Individual legal methods can be readily formalized, while the 
choice of which legal methods to apply are less so.  Thus, that aspect of 
legal interpretation was not modeled.  Interpretive rules are decidable, 
self-consistent, hierarchically structured, and at times defy the 
formalist/realist dichotomy.  Formalist rules are easiest to model 
computationally, because the results are most predictable; the lament of 
“mechanical jurisprudence.”  However, realist rules can also be 
modeled, and modeling them reveals the enthymematic presumptions of 
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realism.  We see clearly the problem of multi-factor interest analysis 
when we ask ourselves exactly which factors are chosen and then what 
weights are to be given to the varying interests.  Courts generally “duck” 
the question of exactly how they weight the interests.  When pressed, 
they tend to rely on economic evaluation as an objective metric for 
weighting of interests.  Economic theories, due to quantification, lend 
themselves well to computational modeling, however teleological ones 
do not since goals are abstract.  Modeling policy considerations is only 
possible very generally and abstractly and does not lead to an algorithm 
that generates a certain definite outcome across a broad class of cases.  
Nevertheless, the self-consistent hierarchical nature of interpretation 
enables the elaboration of the clearest and simplest rules. First, black 
letter “plain meaning” arguments, then grammatical and structural 
arguments, followed by historical arguments seeking legislative intent 
and finally, at the most abstract level, teleological/policy arguments.101
The formalist/realist dichotomy then emerges as a spectrum with the 
initial arguments as most formal, and the final arguments as most realist; 
though the study shows the dichotomy is not always apt, it also reveals 
the spectral character of that dichotomy. 
 101. “Savigny distinguished, in modern parlance, textual, verbal or grammatical interpretation, 
systematic, structural or contextual interpretation, and historical interpretation.”  Brugger, supra
note 45, at 396-97. 
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